




I. The Usual Normative and Empirical Focus of the Sanctions Debate
Sanctions, and more generally international trade law and policy, are a subset
of American foreign policy. Sanctions are one way in which America interacts-
or does not interact-with the rest of the world. Ronald Steel argues in his excellent
little book, Temptations of a Superpower, that the central unresolved problem
in America's post-Cold War foreign policy is the translation of unparalleled
military might built up during the Cold War into political influence.' For example,
America was embarrassingly unable to dissuade Pakistan from testing nuclear
devices in response to India's nuclear tests. 2 This problem is manifest whenever
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1. See RONALD STEEL, TEMPTATIONS OF A SUPERPOWER 1-7 (1995).
2. Headlines from some of the world's most prestigious English-speaking newspapers bellowed
America's impotence. See, e.g., Jim Hoagland, The Lone Superpower Is Falling Behind the Curve,
INT'L HERALD TIaB. (London), June 4, 1998, at 10 (emphasis added); Pakistan, Answering India,
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sanctions are used, particularly when they are deployed by the United States
unilaterally-as is typically the case.
Through sanctions, instead of military force, America is trying not simply to
express displeasure, but more importantly to induce a change in the behavior,
or even cause the downfall, of another country's government. Sanctions are,
psychologists would tell us, a Skinnerian tool for positive or negative reinforce-
ment. Potential targets are akin to rats in a cage that receive a food pellet for
correct behavior (i.e., no sanction, but rather a reward like foreign assistance),
or an electric shock for wrong behavior (i.e., imposition of a sanction).
The powerful psychology analogy rightly suggests that the debate about Ameri-
ca's use of sanctions is interdisciplinary. Lawyers, diplomats, economists, political
scientists, historians, and philosophers offer a variety of perspectives, along with
human rights activists, environmentalists, and other concerned lobbying groups
and citizens. Despite this motley collection of voices, nearly the entire debate is
focused on just two issues. First, is the normative purpose for invoking the sanction
appropriate? Is it, for example, a proper policy to use sanctions to pry open an
overseas market to American business? To combat human rights abuses and reli-
gious persecution? To confront or contain a stubborn dictator? To prevent nuclear
proliferation? For some, these suggestions may be easy cases. But what about using
sanctions to combat corruption, 4 or to discourage abortion? 5 The normative issue,
then, is one of drawing lines-of defining legitimate from illegitimate purposes
without sliding down a slippery slope of indefensible sanctions.
The second commonly debated issue concerns the efficacy of sanctions. Do
sanctions work, i.e., do they modify the behavior of their target? If so, do sanctions
work only after imposing an unacceptably large opportunity cost on American
businesses (and their workers)? After all, these businesses would otherwise:
(1) offer goods and services to trade with the target country; (2) win lucrative
procurement contracts from the target country's government; and (3) directly
Carries out Nuclear Tests; Clinton's Appeal Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at Al (emphasis
added); Farhan Bokhari et al., Pakistan Resists U.S. Pressure Over Nuclear Test, FIN. TIMES, May
15-16, 1998, at 1 (emphasis added).
3. For an excellent collection of perspectives, see ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (David Cortright &
George A. Lopez eds., 1995). See generally BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS (1988) for a discussion of the haphazard nature of U.S. sanctions regimes.
4. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, Kantor Calls for Bribery Action, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 1996, at 3
(noting the loss to U.S. companies of $20 billion worth of contracts as a result of rival firms offering
bribes); Helene Cooper, Kantor Suggests Using Trade Sanctions as a Way to Fight Foreign Corruption,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1996, at A2 (discussing former United States Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor's suggestion that the United States use trade sanctions to fight foreign corruption).
5. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, On Abortion, It's Clinton vs. the U.N., WALL ST. J., May
5, 1998, at A22 (concerning President Clinton's threat to veto legislation that authorizes payment
of U.S. 's dues to the United Nations but contains a provision barring funds to groups that perform
abortions in violation of foreign laws or that lobby for abortion in foreign countries); Bruce Clark,
When Life is at Stake, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11-12, 1998, at I (discussing efforts of the anti-abortion
lobby to persuade Congress to withhold disbursement of funds from America's $13 billion foreign
assistance budget with respect to countries that practice abortion).
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engage in profitable foreign investments in the target country. Even if the opportu-
nity cost is not unacceptable, what about the strain on relations with America's
trading partners? Overall, the heart of this empirical issue is whether the cost
of sanctions exceeds their benefits based on historical experience.6 Fortunately,
Congress has taken up this issue. In June 1998, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott
(R-Miss.) and Senate Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) established a
bipartisan Senate Task Force on Economic Sanctions, headed by Senator Mitch
McConnell (R-Ky.), to examine the efficacy of sanctions.7
This issue has a corollary, namely, the danger of overuse. The corollary is
also an empirical problem, though one that looks forward and calls for a prediction
as opposed to sizing up the past. Even if it is agreed that a proposed sanction
is well-grounded on policy and likely to achieve a desired outcome, the proposal
still needs to be viewed in the overall context of extant sanctions, and possibly
more justified sanctions in the future. There is a legitimate fear that too-frequent
deployment of the sanctions weapon will render it ineffective. Potential targets
will be nonplused by the threat of sanctions. They will build that threat into their
rational calculus when considering a course of conduct at which America is sure
to look askance. This fear is manifest in the efforts-as yet unsuccessful-by
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Congressmen Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) and
Philip M. Crane (R-ll.) to slow the pace of unilateral sanctions by the United
States through a new law that would require greater consultation between the
White House and Congress on the use of sanctions, including the consideration
of alternative measures such as diplomacy and multilateral pressure.8
The Clinton Administration has been widely criticized for its handling of both
the normative and empirical issues. It stands accused of failing to distinguish the
reasonable from the ridiculous as to predicates for sanctions; of not thinking
through the effect of sanctions on the target; and of seeing very few sanctions pro-
posals it did not, in the end, support. The accusation is not unfair. The Administra-
tion has, for example, eagerly resorted to sanctions against Burma, China, Cuba,
India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan. 9 To be thorough, a sizeable portion of the
blame lies at the steps of Capitol Hill. In June 1998, the President vetoed the Iran
6. There are a large number of excellent empirical studies on this topic. Several of the major
recent ones are discussed in Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law, 31 U.C.
DAVis L. REV. 1, 116-21 (1997). See also Marc Selinger, Ex-Im Bank Head Criticizes Sanctions
Bills, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 824 (May 13, 1998) (reporting that the Chairman of the United
States Export-Import Bank opposes the proposed Freedom from Religious Persecution Act, and other
sanctions legislation, in part because they deny U.S. firms business but have little effect on the
targeted countries, which find non-U.S. companies to sell to them).
7. See, e.g., Senators to Review U.S.-Imposed Sanctions, WASH. PosT, June 27, 1998, at A8.
8. See Gary G. Yerkey, Hamilton, Crane Introduce Bill to Slow Imposition of Unilateral Sanc-
tions by U.S., 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1863 (Oct. 29, 1997). Their bill is known as the Sanctions
Reform Act. See Marc Selinger, Curb Unilateral Sanctions, Lawmakers Urge Colleagues, 15 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 553 (Apr. 1, 1998).
9. See generally L. Kirk Wolcott, Seeking Effective Sanctions, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 351
(1998) (discussing the increasing use of sanctions by the U.S. government).
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Missiles Sanctions Act, which would have punished persons transferring items to
Iran that would help Iran build ballistic missiles. Congress may yet override this
veto,' 0 and as of late July 1998 it still had over two dozen other sanctions bills under
consideration that would affect nations from Azerbaijan to Vietnam. "
It is a stunning fact that two-thirds of the world's population is subject to one
type or another of American sanctions, with more than half of the 115 sanctions
schemes implemented by the United States since World War I initiated since
1994. 2 To borrow from De Gaulle, this fact hardly bespeaks the grandeur of a
nation. The sanctions schemes typically reflect a hodgepodge of at best translu-
cent, but very often simply wrong-headed, policies. The success of sanctions
against targets usually is dubious, 3 yet their effects on the innocent are often
dreadful. Accordingly, it is difficult for even the most impartial of observers to
rebut the proposition that "America has a sanctions-based foreign policy," or
to see anything more than post hoc casuistry in the efforts to defend this policy.
H. Towards a Generic Conceptual Framework
It is tempting to delve further into this fray, but of what use is it to add to the
mounting of criticism of the sanctions-based foreign policy? A more valuable
10. See Nancy Dunne, Sanctions Overload, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 1998, at 13; Nancy Dunne,
Clinton Vetoes New Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at 6.
11. See Dunne, Sanctions Overload, supra note 10, at 13; Nancy Dunne, U.S. Congress Consider-
ing Wide Range of Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, June 5, 1998, at 3. In Fall 1998, after this writing,
President Clinton approved two more sanctions bills. He signed the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, H.R. 2431, Pub. L. No. 105-292, on October 27, 1998. This Act is not directed at any
particular country, or in support of any particular faith. The Act creates the position of "Ambassador at
Large" to monitor the state of religious freedom. In the event the violations of religious freedom
are systematic, ongoing, and egregious, and are accompanied by flagrant denials of the right to
life, liberty, or personal security (e.g., torture, enforced and arbitrary disappearances, or arbitrary
prolonged detention), the Act directs the President to impose economic sanctions. These sanctions
may be waived if the violations cease, if a waiver would further the purposes of the Act, or if required
by important national interests. Medicines, food, and other humanitarian assistance are excepted
from the sanctions scheme. See William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Religious
Freedom Act, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2149 (Oct. 27, 1998). For the legislative history to
the Act, see Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998, H.R. Rep. No. 105-480, 105th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1 (April 1, 1998) and pt. 2 (May 8, 1998).
Also in October 1998, the President signed an omnibus appropriations bill, H.R. 4328, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, title IX of which was the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998. This bill is discussed
below. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
12. See Dunne, Sanctions Overload, supra note 10, at 13. See also Thomas Omestad, Addicted to
Sanctions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 15, 1998, at 30 (stating that "[n]o other country on earth
opts for sanctions as often as America," and that American sanctions apply to seventy countries).
13. In congressional testimony by witness after witness, in studies by think tank after think tank,
and in editorials by writer after writer, the point has been made that very rarely has an American
unilateral sanctions scheme caused the target to change its behavior in a material "positive" way.
See, e.g., Selinger, supra note 6, at 824; Willard Berry, Why Sanctions Don't Work, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 14; see generally Unilateral Sanctions Are Not Effective, Private Sector Witnesses
Tell Senate Panel, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 4, 1997); Group Says U.S. Sanctions Are Largely
Ineffective, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B16.
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contribution is to step back and consider how to think more clearly about sanctions
in a non-normative, non-empirical manner. Would our sanctions debate be more
informed if we first read carefully what sanctions legislation says? In turn, would
we be able to peruse the statute better if we knew what questions to ask before
we opened the United States Code? Brushing over these points, many American
media accounts of sanctions are long on hype yet short on examination. 14 They
inflame rather than instruct, providing no guidance on how to think critically
and dispassionately about sanctions. Setting aside the normative issue of purpose
and the empirical issue of efficacy, how might we confront existing or proposed
sanctions legislation? Might it be possible to develop a conceptual framework-
or put less pretentiously, an algorithm-that can be used generically?
This article provides an affirmative answer. A seven-step model is developed
to help understand what any unfamiliar, complex sanctions legislation says, and
what it purports to do. The table below offers a synopsis of the model. The model
is positivist in nature. It seeks to reveal legal doctrine and consequences, and
eschew the interesting but messy and over-played normative debate about the
content of the law. All seven steps rely heavily on conventional legal reasoning
and endeavor to draw careful, critical distinctions.
The seven steps can be remembered by the simple acronym, "MRS. WATU."
Step One calls for an identification of the Method of sanction threatened by the
legislation. Step Two seeks to discern whether the legislation creates a private
Right of action. Step Three considers whether the legislation organizes a Second-
ary boycott. Step Four asks whether Waiver authority exists and, if so, who has
it and what the waiver criteria are. Step Five concerns the Aim of the sanction,
namely, whether it focuses on bad commodities or bad actors, or possibly even
production processes. Step Six examines the statutory criteria, if any, for Termi-
nation of the sanctions. Finally, Step Seven looks at whether the sanction scheme
is Unilateral, as opposed to multilateral, in nature.
The MRS. WATU model is not limited to analyzing what a particular piece of
sanctions legislation says and does. It also reveals why one sanction regime might
be more controversial than another. Typically, the explanation is provided by
referring to normative purposes or empirical effects. It might be said, for instance,
14. Consider an article about American sanctions against India in the aftermath of India's May
1998 detonation of five nuclear devices in the Rajasthan desert. The Wall Street Journal, hardly
known for titillating editorialism, carried the headline India Provokes U.S. Sanctions with New Tests.
See India Problem Sanctions with New Tests, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1998, at A14 (emphasis added).
The word "provokes" in the title may suggest to some readers that India deserved the sanctions.
The suggestion would not be inappropriate were it not for the failure of the article to explain the
legal basis for the provocation. Yet it fails to provide readers with the name of the applicable sanctions
legislation, much less a glimpse of the criteria for and exceptions to imposition of the sanctions.
Instead, the article wanders casually from a discussion of how other countries might react to India's
nuclear tests, to the popularity of the tests in India, to military matters, to President Clinton's telephone
call to the Pakistani prime minister, and finally back to India, with a treatment of the performance
of the Bombay Stock Exchange and India's ability to survive sanctions.
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TABLE: SYNOPOSIS OF THE MRS. WATU MODEL




M-METHOD(S) OF What method(s) of A larger number of methods
SANCTION(S) sanction(s) is used? affects more constituencies
and suggests greater force;
thus it is likely to cause
greater controversy.
RIGHT OF ACTION Is there a private right of A private right of action is
action? almost certain to cause
controversy because it is
private and extraterritorial.
SECONDARY BOYCOTT Is there a secondary A secondary boycott is
boycott? almost certain to cause
controversy because it is
seen as bullying and an
infringement on
sovereignty; it also is likely
to evoke blocking
legislation.
WAIVER AUTHORITY Who (if anyone) has the Waiver decisions are
authority to waive the inherently political, and the
sanction, and what are the degree of controversy is
waiver criteria? likely to depend partly on
the wording of the criteria.
AIM OF SANCTION Is the sanction aimed at a A sanction aimed at a
regime or commodity, or commodity or at a





TERMINATION What criteria, if any, exist A lack of termination criteria
CRITERIA to terminate the sanction? will be controversial in the
long term, and if they exist,
then the degree of contro-
versy is likely to depend
partly on their wording.
UNILATERAL NATURE Is the sanction imposed A de jure and de facto
unilaterally? unilateral sanction is almost
certain to be particularly
controversial.
that the 1996 Helms-Burton Act15 is controversial because sanctions are not the
way to deal with the Castro government, or that sanctions against India and
15. The formal title of this legislation is the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021-6091 (1996)). Guidelines and implementing regulations for the Helms-Burton Act have
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Pakistan under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (Nuclear Prolif-
eration Act)16 are pointless now that the "nuclear genie is out of the bottle."
But, MRS. WATU provides an independent basis for understanding why a sanc-
tion regime is controversial, or relatively more controversial than another. This
basis is neither normative nor empirical, but doctrinal. MRS. WATU focuses on
what the law says and does, not its underlying policy or economic efficacy.
Accordingly, in the discussion below, conclusions about controversies sur-
rounding different sanctions schemes are drawn without basing those conclusions
on the purpose, economic effect, or policy success of those schemes.
The existence of an independent ground for such conclusions ought to give
rise to even greater pause about the use of sanctions. It is bad enough that the
normative and empirical dimensions of sanctions are problematic. Worse yet,
the doctrinal basis renders at least some of the schemes even more controversial.
Yet, this conclusion calls for an admission that while the MRS. WATU model
tries to avoid the normative, the two premises on which the model is constructed
are not both value free. The first premise, which is value free, is that understanding
sanctions legislation can be difficult, and comparing distinct sanctions regimes
can be frustrating. It is simply a fact that both practitioners and scholars need
to know what the law says and does, and that when the law is unclear or poorly
drafted, an effective analytical tool is welcome.
The second premise is normative. Controversy over sanctions should be antici-
pated and minimized whenver possible, particularly controversy between the
United States and its major trading partners such as the European Union (EU),
Canada, Japan, and China. Such controversy is yet another form of trade friction,
just like disputes about tariff barriers or quantitative restrictions that may wind
up before a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel. Trade friction is bad,
especially when it could have been foreseen, reduced, or even avoided. Why?
First, because it carries a potentially large opportunity cost. America's attention,
and the attention of her trading partners, is diverted from more important issues-
namely, trade-liberalizing, wealth-generating initiatives like a trans-Atlantic free
trade area, a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), or an expansion of
the list of covered items subject to duty-free treatment under the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA). These three examples are deliberate-as of this
writing, progress on all three is stalled. To be sure, the snags are not all related
been published. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations: Indirect Financing in Cuba, Civil Penalties,
61 Fed. Reg. 37,385 (1996) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515) (bringing existing Cuban asset
control regulations into conformity with the act); Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996) (implementing provisions of
the act and authorizing the secretary of state and attorney general to deny visas to certain foreigners);
Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996) (summarizing the Act and discussing persons who knowingly
and intentionally traffic in confiscated property).
16. See Pub. L. No. 103-236, April 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 507 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ § 6301-6305, and amending various other sections of titles 12 and 22 of the United States Code).
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to trade friction caused by sanctions. But, surely everyone's mind would be
fresher and more receptive to constructive solutions on these initiatives if sanction-
induced trade friction were not poisoning the atmosphere.
Instead, America and her trading partners fight about whether and how to
sanction a rogue state that in any event may be of little consequence in the world
economy. They lose the broader vision of global free trade, and in the process
lose the decorum and trust so essential to implementing this vision. Second,
despoiling diplomacy undermines the stability and smooth operation of the world
trading system and its institutions. As America and her trading partners become
entrenched in contrasting approaches to a rogue, they warn each other about dire
consequences if sanctions are, or are not, adopted. They threaten each other with
a WTO action, or-ironically-trade measures to force, or counter, the imposition
of sanctions on the rogue. How can the system and its flagship but fledgling
institution, the WTO, function under these strains?
In sum, one of MRS. WATU's virtues is that the model can be used to help
steer anyone, regardless of personal, political, or economic views on sanctions,
through the thicket of sanctions legislation. It is not designed to lead to biased
analytical outcomes. But, along with this virtue is my subjective belief that
applying the seven steps in the model to sanctions legislation might achieve the
worthy goal of helping avoid or reduce trade friction.
Il. The Seven Steps
A. STEP ONE: M-THE METHOD OF SANCTION: WHAT METHOD(S) OF
SANCTION(S) IS USED?
This question does not go to the purpose of the sanction; rather, it seeks to
classify sanctions regardless of purpose. Broadly speaking, any sanction may be
placed in one or more of three methodological categories-foreign aid, trade,
and ostracism. By classifying a sanction correctly, it is easier to understand its
potential severity and, therefore, the controversy it is likely to provoke.
When the United States withdraws bilateral assistance from a target country,
it is imposing a foreign aid sanction on that country. ' 7 Typically, only humanitar-
ian aid, such as the sort going to North Korea in 1997-98 for famine relief, is
exempt from the sanction. 18 Likewise, when the United States withdraws support
for multilateral assistance-for example, lending programs sponsored by the
17. Frequently, the bilateral assistance at issue is authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2430 (1994).
18. The humanitarian assistance may, for example, be provided under the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, commonly known as "Public Law 480,"
7 U.S.C. § 1701-1736d. See, e.g., Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade States, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess. 164 (1997) [hereinafter Overview and Compilation] (concerning Title [1 of P.L. 480, which
authorizes donations of American agricultural commodities for emergency humanitarian relief and
development projects, and which is implemented primarily through private voluntary organizations
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World Bank or International Monetary Fund-for a target nation, it is utilizing
a foreign aid sanction.
A trade sanction may take one of three forms. First, the United States may
deny the target country or person market access with respect to bilateral trade
in goods and services-in other words, that country's businesses are precluded
from selling their wares or offering their services in the United States. Second,
the United States may prohibit American businesses from exporting goods to,
or providing services in, the target country. Whereas the first manifestation of
a trade sanction amounts to an import embargo, this second manifestation is an
export embargo.' 9 Both embargoes exist, for instance, with respect to Iran. Third,
the United States may bar U.S. businesses from engaging in foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in a target country. (Conceptually, a fourth form exists when FDI
from the target country into the United States is banned. This is rarely relevant
in practice because most targets or potential targets have little in the way of
multinational enterprises.)
The first form of trade sanction ought to enrage American consumers of the
banned products and services, assuming no acceptable substitutes exist. That it
does not in some instances may simply reflect consumer ignorance, or a lack of
consumer organization. Also, the second and third forms are devilishly controver-
sial, as they are seen to deny profitable opportunities to American businesses.
By one of many estimates, the 1995 opportunity cost of foregone American
exports amounted to $15-19 billion and 200,000-250,000 American jobs. °
The distinction between foreign aid and trade sanctions is not necessarily iron-
clad. Some foreign assistance programs are designed to boost trade. The financing
programs of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) and the financing and political
risk insurance programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
are examples. In barring Ex-Im and OPIC support for American business opera-
tions in or with the target country, the United States is denying the target assistance
that would facilitate trade and investment. More generally, one aim of many
foreign assistance programs is to help the recipient develop into a healthy U.S.
trading partner. Still, foreign aid sanctions are fundamentally different from trade
sanctions. Cutting off foreign aid is a self-imposed restraint on public generosity-
the U.S. government refuses to provide what it otherwise would give to the
and the United Nations world food program, and Title III of P.L. 480, which authorizes donations
to governments of least developed countries for direct feeding programs, emergency food reserves,
and recipient government sales that are used to finance economic development activities).
19. Commonly used statutory authorities for such embargoes are the 1917 Trading With the
Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 1-44, and the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act of 1977 (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, though with respect to Cuba, specific authority
for a total embargo is set forth in section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(a)(1). See Overview and Compilation, supra note 18, at 167-75, 178-80.
20. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sanctions Against Other Countries Cost Exporters Up To $19
Billion, Study Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 736 (Apr. 23, 1997); Robert Corzine & Nancy
Dunne, U.S. Business Hits at Use of Unilateral Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at 6.
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target. In contrast, a trade sanction addresses private actors. Simply stated, the
United States says to private businesses "cease your trade (and/or investment)
activities."
Foreign aid and trade sanctions are economic in nature. They concern the
economic relations between the United States and the target. In contrast, ostracism
sanctions are political in nature. 21 Through an ostracism sanction, the United
States attempts to isolate the target from the world community. Like a foreign
assistance sanction, and unlike a trade sanction, an ostracism is a self-imposed
restraint on public behavior under which the U.S. government avoids official
contact with the target. For example, it tries to deny the target membership in
important organizations (such as the IMF or WTO) or supports resolutions that
denounce the target if it already has membership in the organization in question
(for example, United Nations General Assembly resolutions). In addition, the
United States may seek to isolate individual officials from the target government
or businesses from the target country by denying them entry visas into the United
States. To be sure, political ostracism may have an economic effect on the target.
For instance, denial or deferral of accession to the WTO means a target will not
enjoy most-favored nation (MFN) treatment with those WTO Members with
which it has not negotiated previously for such treatment on a bilateral basis.22
Nonetheless, this effect is an externality; the thrust of an ostracism is to treat
the target like a child told by an authority figure to stand alone and stand in a
corner because of bad behavior.
Categorizing sanctions by method highlights the severity of a sanctions regime.
The Helms-Burton Act uses all three methods and thus is as severe as possible.
Through this Act, the United States denies assistance, both bilateral and through
multilateral organizations, to Cuba until a transition government is in place.23
Furthermore, the United States seeks to restrict investment in Cuba that uses
American property confiscated by the Castro government.2 Finally, the United
21. See generally Craig R. Giesze, Helms-Burton in Light of the Common Law and Civil Law
Legal Traditions: Is Legal Analysis Alone Sufficient to Settle Controversies Arising Under International
Law on the Eve of the Second Summit of the Americas?, 32 INT'L LAW. 51 (1998) (arguing that
legal analysis alone is not sufficient to settle the Helms-Burton controversy under international laws,
and offering three policy options to ensure the "polemic" law does not jeopardize efforts to achieve
hemispheric free trade).
22. For a discussion of the MFN principle, see RAJ BHALA & KEvIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE
LAW § 1-2 (1998). For a discussion of MFN treatment and WTO accession with specific reference
to China, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 91-97, 215-17
(1996).
23. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 6033(a) (1994) (barring loans and extensions of credit); 22 U.S.C.
§ 6042(1)(A) (1994) (concerning Presidential reports on assistance to Cuba); see Bhala, supra note
6, at 59.
24. See 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (1994); see Bhala, supra note 6, at 69-78; Overview and Compilation,
supra note 18, at 180.
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States forbids entry for officials and their families who have trafficked in confis-
cated property."
In contrast, the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)26 focuses primarily
on trade and investment sanctions, and then only in the petroleum resource indus-
try,27 making its scope far less draconian (though these sectors are particularly
important to the Iranian and Libyan economies). American sanctions against
India and Pakistan under the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act are even
narrower in scope, as they primarily affect foreign assistance flows from the
United States to India and Pakistan. 2 Notwithstanding the bar on lending by
American banks to the Indian and Pakistani governments, all trade and investment
transactions not relying on such flows, and all political contacts, are untouched.
Likewise, the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1986 (Narcotics Trade Act) relies
on foreign assistance sanctions.29
Why is it that, at least prima facie, the broader the sanctions methodology,
the more controversial the sanctions legislation is likely to be? One possibility
is that if more sanctions are used, then more constituencies are potentially affected
in an adverse manner. Such constituencies are sure to be not only in the United
States, but also in the target country, and possibly in other countries if a secondary
boycott (discussed later) is involved. Nonetheless, whether the predicted relation-
ship actually manifests itself depends upon additional MRS. WATU variables,
and possibly other factors. Moreover, it is common sense to expect greater contro-
versy if the United States is attacking a target on more, rather than fewer, fronts.
That is, notwithstanding adverse effects on constituencies, deploying a multiplic-
ity of methods may be perceived as unfairly beating up on a vulnerable, even
defenseless, target.
25. See 22 U.S.C. § 6091 (1994); see Bhala, supra note 6, at 81-85; Overview and Compilation,
supra note 18, at 180-81.
26. Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note).
The State Department has published guidelines on the implementation of the ILSA at 61 Fed. Reg.
66,067 (1996).
27. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994); see Bhala, supra note 6, at 98-101, 103-112; Overview and
Compilation, supra note 18, at 177-78. In the ILSA menu of sanction choices for the president,
there is one that affects foreign aid, namely, a ban on official U.S. credits or credit guarantees to
support the export of goods or services to the target.
28, See 22 U.S.C. § 6301(a)(1) (1994) (the government procurement sanction); 22 U.S.C.
§ 6303(d) (1994) (ban on designation as a primary dealer in U.S. treasury securities, and restriction
on expansion of business operations in the United States); JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 398, 507-09 (discussing additional
sanctions such as a ban on arms sales, opposition to multilateral development bank lending, and a
bar on United States Export-Import Bank assistance); see Mark Felsenthal, et al., President Imposes
Tough Sanctions Against India in Response to Nuclear Tests, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 814 (May
13, 1998).
29. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 9001, 100 Stat. 3207-164 (1986), codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2491-2495.
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B. STEP Two: R-WHETHER A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTS: DOES
THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION?
It is somewhat unusual for such legislation to empower a private party to sue
wrongdoers identified in the legislation. Indeed, in the context of foreign assis-
tance and ostracism sanctions, a private right of action would make little sense.
As both types of sanctions are public in nature, it would be incongruous, if not
doctrinally indefensible, to grant private parties the right to sue for wrongful
provision or receipt of foreign assistance, or wrongful political relations. But,
in some cases, trade sanctions legislation may afford a private right of action.
The argument is that a private party whose international business transactions
are adversely affected by a violation of a trade sanction ought to have a right of
redress.
Here, then, is another reason the Helms-Burton Act is so controversial.
Whereas the ILSA, Narcotics Trade Act, and Nuclear Proliferation Act create
no private rights of action, the Helms-Burton Act allows private persons whose
property was confiscated by the Castro government to sue alleged traffickers of
that property .30 The justification in this context is that such persons may have
been victimized more than once-first by the initial expropriation, and again by
the profitable use of their assets by firms from third countries.
The prospect of being hauled into federal district court is understandably upset-
ting to foreign corporations, 31 which might have had no contact with the United
States. Moreover, the governments of the home countries of those corporations
understandably seek to protect their corporations. Indeed, they might enact legis-
lation to block extraterritorial enforcement of the American sanction-as Canada
and a number of other governments have done with respect to the Helms-Burton
Act.32 Thus, a private right of action renders sanctions legislation particularly
controversial for two reasons-it is private and extraterritorial. Obviously, were
a private right of action to exist against a foreign sovereign as well as sanctions
legislation to deny the sovereign the traditional public international law defenses
of act of state or sovereign immunity, then to say the legislation might be contro-
versial would be an understatement.
30. See 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (1994); Bhala, supra note 6, at 69-78; Overview and Compilation,
supra note 18, at 180.
31. For a thoughtful argument that the Helms-Burton Act misuses the judiciary as a weapon of
foreign policy, and more generally that federal courts are a poor institution to use to pursue coordinated
policies against other nations because they are not unified, swift, or rational but rather are decentral-
ized, are plagued by delay, and focus on the facts of a particular case, see John Yoo, Federal Courts
as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
Ray. 747 (1997).
32. See, e.g., Peter Glossop, Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act and U.S. Restric-
tions on Trade with Cuba, 32 INT'L LAW. 93 (1998) (discussing the Canadian blocking legislation).
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C. STEP THREE: S-WHETHER A SECONDARY BOYCOTT IS INVOLVED: DOES
THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION PENALIZE THIRD COUNTRIES FOR DEALING
WITH THE TARGET?
Does the sanction call for a secondary boycott of the target, or does the sanction
simply restrain the behavior of the United States and its firms vis-A-vis the target?
All three types of sanctions-foreign aid, trade, and ostracism-can entail a
secondary boycott. If so, a third country that violates America's primary boycott
(e.g., by providing aid to, engaging in trade with, or having political relations
with, the target) might become a target of sanctions. This specter is designed to
have an in terrorem effect designed to promote widespread, if not multilateral,
participation in the sanctions. The analogy to domestic labor law is obvious, as
when baggage handlers and mechanics might strike against an airline in sympathy
with a strike by that airline's flight attendants.
But, the analogy is also a clue to the consequent mess. Baggage handlers might
not like being told by an authority that they had to strike or else. In the global
economy of the late twentieth century, the legal problem created by a secondary
boycott is one of extraterritoriality that can be stated in terms of a clash of
sovereign interests. To supporters of the legislation, at stake is the rule of law-
the Helms-Burton Act helps protect American property rights, and the ILSA is
a bulwark against outlaw nations.33 But virtually no American trading partner,
however staunch a military and political ally, is pleased at being compelled under
threat of punishment to participate in a unilaterally-conceived American sanctions
regime. It is an infringement on each partner's freedom to choose among foreign
policy options with respect to the target of America's sanctions. 34 It is also bla-
tantly hypocritical, as the United States has blocking legislation against the Arab
boycott of Israel, which entails, inter alia, a secondary boycott.35
Thus, there is no small wonder why the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA are so
33. See, e.g., Big-Hearted President, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at A14.
34. For a French legal view of this problem, see Brigitte Stem, Can the United States Set Rules
for the World?, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1997). Canadian and Mexican views are set out in Fifteenth
Annual Symposium on International Legal Practice-The Helms-Burton Act: Domestic Initiatives
and Foreign Responses, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 799, 809 (1997). For American views
on the legality of the Helms-Burton secondary boycott regarding trafficking in confiscated property,
see Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade
Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1998); Antroy A. Arreola, Note, Who's Isolating Whom?:
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act and Compliance with International Law, 20 HOUSTON J. INT'L L.
355 (1998); Brian J. Welke, Note, GATT and NAFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has the United
States Violated Multilateral Agreements?, 4 TuLSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 361 (1997); Stephen V.
Iglesias, The Legality of the Helms-Burton Act Under NAFTA: An Analysis of the Arguments the
United States, Canada, and Mexico May Present to a Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution Panel, 3 NAFTA:
L. & Bus. REv. OF THE AMERICAS 116 (1997).
35. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1994); Fitzgerald, supra note 34, at 49-60.
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controversial. Both call for secondary boycotts.3 6 Further, because the Helms-
Burton Act encompasses all three types of sanctions, and creates treble-damage
liability for trafficking in confiscated American property, this Act is uniquely
contentious. In contrast, the Narcotics Trade Act and the Nuclear Proliferation
Act are less controversial with respect to this factor because neither calls for a
secondary boycott.
D. STEP FOUR: M-THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF WAIVER AUTHORITY:
DOES THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION CONTAIN WAIVER AUTHORITY,
AND IF SO, WHO HAS IT AND WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR
OBTAINING A WAIVER?
Most, if not all, sanctions legislation provides some mechanism to "call off
the dogs." (Even if no such mechanism were to exist in the statute, there is
always the possibility, however cumbersome or unlikely, of Congress revising
the statute.) In many instances, such as the 1996 Helms-Burton Act and the ILSA,
the authority to waive imposition of sanctions rests with the president.37 Yet there
are contrasting illustrations, such as the Nuclear Proliferation Act, where the
president's hands are tied rather snugly, and the balance of discretion seems to
lie in Congress. Assuming waiver authority exists, criteria will be articulated in
the legislation explaining the circumstances under which sanctions need not be
imposed on an otherwise deserving target.
The Nuclear Proliferation Act is interesting in part because the exact waiver
criteria differ depending on the sanction at issue. Until this Act was amended
in October 1998 by the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (after this writing),
the criteria were as follows. 38 For some sanctions, such as opposition to financial
36. See 22 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1)(A) (1994) (authorizing the president to terminate aid to countries
that provide assistance to Cuba); 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (Supp. II 1996) (civil liability for trafficking in
confiscated American assets); see also Bhala, supra note 6, at 78-81; Overview and Compilation, supra
note 18, at 180. See 19 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions);
see also, Bhala, supra note 6, at 101-03; Overview and Compilation, supra note 18, at 177-78.
37. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6085(a)-(b) (Supp. IT 1996) (concerning suspension of the effective date
of the Act); 22 U.S.C. § 6033(b) (Supp. II 1996) (concerning suspension of the foreign assistance
sanctions); 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996) (concerning suspension of the right to bring
a lawsuit for trafficking in confiscated property); and 22 U.S.C. §§ 6091(c)-(d) (Supp. I 1996)
(concerning exceptions to the rule against excluding foreigners); Bhala, supra note 6, at 56-58, 84;
Overview and Compilation, supra note 18, at 180-81; 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994) (Iran and Libya
Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions; Presidential waiver); see also, Bhala, supra note 6, at
114-16; Overview and Compilation, supra note 18, at 177-78. Concerning the ILSA, the President's
waiver authority is more limited with respect to Libya than Iran. It is possible for the President to
waive sanctions against Iran if Iran agrees to undertake "substantial measures," including economic
sanctions, to combat international terrorism. No such authority exists with respect to Libya.
38. In October 1998, the president signed an omnibus appropriations bill, H.R. 4328, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, Title IX of which was the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998. The Relief Act is reprinted
in H. REP. No. 105-825, 144 CONG. REc. H11054 (Oct. 19, 1998). It is rather confusing, in part
because it directly implicates an array of other intricate statutes. In brief, what the Relief Act seems
to do is the following.
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assistance to a target country from the World Bank and IMF, or loans to the
target by United States banks, no presidential waiver authority was provided.39
As a result, the American directors of the World Bank and IMF at least could
argue to their fellow directors they had no choice as to how to vote. Regarding
official credit and credit guarantees (such as by the Ex-Im and OPIC), as well
as military financing, the president's waiver authority was limited to instances
where withholding such assistance "would have a serious adverse effect on vital
United States interests. "4
First, Section 902(a) of the Relief Act allows the president to waive, for a period of up to one
year, certain sanctions that otherwise would be mandatorily imposed on India, Pakistan, or both.
See id. and 22 U.S.C. §§ 2375(e) (Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which
is amended by Section 902(a) of the Relief Act), 2799aa and 2799aa-l(b) (Sections 101 and 102 of
the Arms Export Control Act, which is amended by Section 902(a) of the Relief Act), and 12 U.S.C.
§ 635 (Section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Ban of 1945, which is amended by Section 902(a) of
the Relief Act). The sanctions eligible for waiver are non-military foreign assistance, American
opposition to World Bank and International Monetary Fund lending or financial or technical assistance,
United States bank lending or credit extension, and Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees. It
also appears that the conditional ban on certain military equipment sales and technology transfers
to Pakistan may be waived, specifically with respect to those sales and transfers referred to in Section
620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2375(e), but not with respect to those
sales and transfers exempted under Section 902(b) of the Relief Act from the one-year waiver authority.
Section 902(b) explains that the military sales and transfers that are not encompassed by the waiver
are listed in Sections 102(b)(2)(B)-(C) and (G) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-
I(b)(2)(B)-(C) and (G). Section 620E(e) of the 1961 Act bars the United States from providing
Pakistan with military assistance, equipment, or technology unless the president certifies to Congress
that Pakistan does not have a nuclear explosive device and that American military assistance to
Pakistan would reduce significantly the chance that Pakistan would possess one. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 2375(e)(1). Obviously, as a declared nuclear power, Pakistan does have such a device (or can put
one together reasonably quickly), so this condition no longer makes any sense.
Second, under Section 903, the president must consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
House International Relations Committee, and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees
before exercising this waiver authority.
Third, under Section 904, no later than 30 days before the expiration of a one-year waiver period,
the secretary of state must provide these committees with a report on economic and national security
developments in India and Pakistan.
If the Relief Act illustrates a broader proposition about the administration's sanctions "policy,"
it is that it seems quite content to impose ostensibly tough sanctions up front, and soon thereafter
back off, hence undermining the long-term credibility of the sanctions. Indeed, on November 7, 1998,
President Clinton announced he was exercising his new waiver authority to restore Export-Import Bank
(and Overseas Private Investment Corporation) programs for India and Pakistan, lift restrictions on
American banking operations in India and Pakistan, and resume military education and training
programs in Indian and Pakistan. See President Clinton Eases Some Sanctions Against India, Pakistan
After Nuke-Test Ban, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1931 (Nov. 18, 1998). Six days later, the Department
of Commerce identified 40 Indian and 46 Pakistani entities covered by American export restrictions
because of their suspected involvement in nuclear weapons and missile proliferation. See Commerce
Announces Export Controls Against Indian, Pakistani Entities, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1931
(Nov. 18, 1998).
39. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2799aa-l(b)(2)(E)-(F) (1994). As of this writing, it is not clear whether
the sanction against "United States bank[s]" applies only to commercial banks (e.g., Chase Manhat-
tan), or to investment banks as well (e.g., Merrill Lynch). See Michael M. Phillips, U.S. Banks
Are Pressing for Slack in India Sanctions, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1998, at A15.
40. 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(b)(6)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
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With respect to foreign aid and sales of military equipment and technology
by the United States to the target, the Congress by joint resolution first had to
approve a request from the president for a one-time only delay (but not waiver)
of imposition of sanctions of not more than thirty days."' This request had to
certify that "an immediate imposition of sanctions. . . would be detrimental to
the national security of the United States." 42 If Congress approves the joint
resolution, then the president might waive the sanction following the delay period
(i.e., provide foreign aid, and continue with sales of military equipment and
technology, to the target). In any case, the president might waive the sanction
only upon certifying to Congress that imposing the sanction "would be seriously
prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security." 43 Why is the process
for waiving the prohibition on military sales and foreign aid so stringent in that
it entails a Congressional resolution? Possibly because military sales and foreign
aid are so politically sensitive (although official credits, credit guarantees, and
military financing are hardly unimportant).
Understanding waiver authority leads to three insights about prospective sanc-
tions controversies. First, politics ineluctably enter into presidential waiver deci-
sions. Certainly, congressional waiver decisions are hardly immune from outside
influences. But when discretion lies with the president, the White House becomes
the target for pressure. Indeed, the existence of one all-important target, instead
of 535 members of Congress, none of whom individually is where "the buck
stops," may even galvanize constituencies politically affected by impending sanc-
tions. Indeed, following intense and ultimately successful lobbying efforts by
the EU and American businesses, President Clinton was roundly (and not unfairly)
criticized for "fudging the facts" and disingenuously using the waiver authority
granted to him under the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA. Factors that Congress
might not have intended to enter into presidential waiver decisions-such as broad
foreign policy concerns, or linkages among diverse issues-do manage to creep
into White House decision-making. A case in point is the arrangement negotiated
in April and May of 1998 between President Clinton and the European Union
to manage the controversy over the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA.
The agreement calls for the president to: (1) grant waivers to European compa-
nies that otherwise would be affected by the law (e.g., the French oil giant,
Total, which is involved in a $2 billion natural gas project in Iran); (2) seek from
Congress statutory waiver authority for the one key part of the Helms-Burton
41. See 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(b)(4)(A) (1994).
42. 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(b)(4)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
43. 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(b)(5) (1994) (emphasis added). An additional waiver mechanism, not
requiring a congressional resolution, is provided in section 2799aa-1(2) with respect to foreign
assistance sanctions only. Here the President must certify in writing that terminating aid "would be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security" (emphasis added).
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Act currently bereft of such authority-namely exclusion from entry into the
United States of officers (and their relations) of foreign corporations that invest
in confiscated property; and (3) consult Congress on the possibility of removing
the six-month time limit on the duration of Presidential waivers with respect to
civil liability for trafficking in confiscated assets." In exchange, the EU agrees
to: (1) discourage the kind of behavior the law seeks to penalize (e.g., trafficking
in American property confiscated by the Castro government, or selling sensitive
technologies to Iran and Libya), indeed to work towards binding disciplines
against such behavior and create a global registry of confiscated American prop-
erty, so that multinational companies will be on notice about what prospective
business investments in Cuba should be avoided; and (2) drop its WTO complaint
against the United States regarding the Helms-Burton Act.
This political solution must be seen as a piece in the overall framework of
U.S.-EU relations. It reflects a mutual desire to avoid a nasty WTO dispute
resolution proceeding, or possibly a trade war, and to get on with preliminary
consideration of a U.S.-EU free trade agreement to create a "New Transatlantic
Marketplace" (NTM).45 (Interestingly, an ulterior motive for France's objections
to the sanctions deal may be a desire to slow NTM negotiations," though in
fairness the French are rightly concerned that acceptance of a sanctions waiver
is an implicit acknowledgment that American sanctions law can have an extraterri-
torial reach. 47) Arguably, the agreement is also an effort to save face for the
United States. By smoothing some of the rough edges of the Helms-Burton Act
and ILSA, it gives these statutes new life, and ensures that prudent companies
around the world will do a "Helms-Burton check" before investing in Cuba,
and an "ILSA check" before investing in the petroleum resource industries of
Iran or Libya.48
44. See Pascal Fletcher, Castro Denounces EU-U.S. Accord on Cuba, FIN. TIMES, May 20,
1998, at 1; Neil Buckley, France Wary of Sanctions Agreement, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 1998, at 6;
Helene Cooper, U.S. Ends Penalties Against Cuba Trade, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1998, at A2; Guy
de Jonquieres & Gerard Baker, Brussels and U.S. End Sanctions Dispute, FIN. TIMES, May 19,
1998, at 1; France Blocks Trans-Atlantic Trade Talks; Cuba, Iran-Libya Resolution a Precondition,
15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 733 (1998). The initial agreement, dated April 11, 1997 and formally
known as The Understanding Between the United States and the European Union, was supplemented
by a second pact on May 18, 1998, in the aftermath of the May 15-16, 1998 Group of Eight Summit
in Birmingham, England.
45. For brief but excellent discussions of the sanctions legislation in the context of trans-Atlantic
relations, see Transatlantic Relations, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at 2; That Awkward Relationship,
The Economist, May 16, 1998, at 51; Burying 1LSA, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 1998, at 25.
46. See Bruce Stokes, Winning Combination, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 1998, at 28.
47. See Bhvshan Bahree, French Threatened to Kill US-EU Sanctions Pact, WALL ST. J., May
20, 1998, at A9.
48. The other side of the argument, put forth by fans of the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA, is
that the United States-EU agreement makes the international competitive playing field un-level,
because American companies are barred from dealings with Cuba, Iran, and Libya, whereas European
companies get lasting waivers for such dealings. See Gerard Baker & Stephen Fidler, U.S. Companies
Will Lose Out in Brussels Accord, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at 7.
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A corollary to the first insight, politics and presidential waivers, is that in spite
of any statutory requirement incumbent on the president to report the basis for
exercising waiver authority, the decision-making process and the real grounds for
the waiver granted may not be transparent. For example, are recent presidential
explanations of the "vital national interests" waivers for Laos or Afghanistan,
but not for Burma and Syria, under the Narcotics Trade Act,4 9 really the "whole
truth"? What pressures were brought to bear on the White House to grant such
waivers, and is the relative importance of the articulated justifications ambiguous
or even hidden? When the waiver criteria involve "national interests" or "na-
tional security," perhaps a veil is all the more likely. Why offer publicly anything
more than a pithy, conclusory explanation that meets just the minimum statutory
threshold for reporting to Congress?
A second insight about prospective sanctions controversies drawn from an
understanding of waiver authority concerns the waiver criteria. The degree of
controversy generated by exercise of the authority-whether presidential or con-
gressional-is likely to depend very much on the statutory wording of the criteria.
A narrow, tightly drafted technical rule gives little room for argument about
whether the stated condition is fulfilled. An illustration would be a provision
empowering the president to waive imposition of sanctions on Libya if Libya
extradites to the United States those named suspects in the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103. In contrast, a broad, malleable rule leaves great room for argument
about whether the rule is met. One example alluded to above is the often-used
phraseology that the president may waive sanctions if he determines it is in the
national interest to do so. Another example (found in ILSA)'0 is the authority
of the president to waive sanctions against a third country if it agrees to undertake
substantial measures that further the purposes of the legislation. Exactly what
the "national interest" is, and what measures might be "substantial," are left
to the president's judgment-and for Congress and the public to second-guess.
Politics aside, are narrow waiver criteria more efficient to administer than
broad criteria? It seems difficult to offer an a priori generalization here.51 On
the one hand, narrow rules may be simple and mechanical to administer, and it may
be fairly obvious what facts need to be gathered in order to render a determination.
Possibly, bureaucrats can get the facts, verify whether the criteria are met, and
supply a straightforward recommendation to the president. In contrast, broad
standards may give rise to vigorous internal debates about the meaning of the
criteria and conclusions to be drawn from their application to a factual predicate.
49. The waiver provision is set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). See also Bhala,
supra note 6, at 32-34 (discussing use of this waiver authority).
50. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 4., Multilateral regime);
see also Bhala, supra note 6, at 114-16.
51. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J.
557 (1992) (using microeconomic analysis to explore the extent to which legal commands should
be promulgated as rules or standards).
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On the other hand, it is not at all clear that the facts to be investigated are any
easier to gather when the waiver criteria are narrow than when they are broad.
It depends on precisely what facts are called for by the criteria. Likewise, it may
not be any easier to apply narrow criteria to a set of facts than to apply broad
criteria, particularly if a few arguably critical facts cannot be obtained and judg-
ment calls must be made. An efficiency argument about drafting waiver criteria
thus can cut both ways.
Third, understanding waiver authority may reveal some of the controversies
that occurred during the legislative process in which a sanctions bill was enacted.
It may be that a strong consensus did not exist for a particular sanctions bill, so
Congress had no choice but to create several "outs" by giving the president
expansively-worded waiver authority. The logic is that it may not be too costly
for Congress to create a vague standard (as opposed to trying to hammer out
specific waiver criteria), and thereby shift costs (defined in terms of interpretation
of the standard) to the president. Conversely, when a strong majority in Congress
is set against a group of potential target countries, it may be easy for Congress
to reach agreement on narrow waiver rules. Accordingly, the president may be
less likely to get waiver authority, and any authority he gets may afford little
room to maneuver. In this regard, the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA contrast well
with the Nuclear Proliferation Act.
E. STEP FIVE: A-THE AIM OF THE SANCTION: ARE THE SANCTIONS
CALLED FOR BY THE LEGISLATION AIMED (I.E., DIRECTED) AT A
REGIME OR A COMMODITY?
Some sanctions are aimed at a commodity because the commodity is bad; the
Narcotics Trade Act is an example. Malefactors are identified as those countries
involved in the cross-border illicit drug trade. The Nuclear Proliferation Act is
another example. It is aimed at possession of a particular commodity-nuclear
devices.
In contrast, some sanctions are aimed at a political regime because the regime
has behaved badly. For example, American trade sanctions against Burma, ban-
ning all new investment there, are designed to express displeasure at the Burmese
government, and particularly its alleged human rights abuses. 52 Likewise, the
ILSA takes aim at two perceived bad guys-Iran's governing mullahs and Colonel
Qaddafi.
Some sanctions may be a hybrid, being aimed at both a commodity and a
regime. The Helms-Burton Act is a good example. Its aim is not simply to deter
52. See Ted Bardacke, Burmese Junta Digs in its Heels as Sanctions Bite Harder, FIN. TIMES,
May 5, 1998, at 9; Myanmar, ASEAN Governments Denounce U.S. Sanctions Action, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 779 (1997); Mark Felsenthal & Daniel Pruzin, Citing Deepening Political Repression,
U.S. Bans All New Investment in Myanmar, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), 718 (1997); U.S. Orders
Curbs Against Burma, FIN. TIMES, April 23, 1997, at 1.
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trafficking in confiscated American property; it is also unabashed about seeking
to overthrow the Castro government.53 Here again, the particularly controversial
nature of the Helms-Burton Act is apparent-a sanction that aims at both a com-
modity and regime is sure to raise howls.
Identifying the aim of legislation highlights why (concededly from an empirical
perspective) a sanction may be dubious. Microeconomic logic suggests regime-
aimed sanctions might be more effective than commodity-aimed sanctions. Sup-
pose a government is a target of a commodity-aimed sanction, but the illicit
product can be acquired from other sources. Consequently, the policy of stamping
out trade in the commodity is unlikely to be realized. The sanctions regime simply
causes a shift in trading patterns. Narcotics, for example, can come from Laos
and Afghanistan, if not Burma, and nuclear materials can be-and are-had by
India and Pakistan, if not North Korea. In other words, commodity-based sanction
schemes are susceptible to being undermined by a substitution effect. Existing
and would-be transactors in the contraband are encouraged to substitute sources,
from a country hit with sanctions to one on which sanctions have yet to be
imposed.
Consequently, a commodity-based sanction is likely to be successful only if there
are no substitutes, and sanctions are imposed on the monopoly supplier. But, even
this success is not likely to persist for very long. The relatively rare instance of a
monopoly over an illicit product by one sanctioned country may create an incentive
for rogue third countries to steal the illicit product from, or smuggle it out of, the
sanctioned monopolist-thus leading to a collapse of the monopoly.
In contrast, a regime-aimed sanction is by definition directed at a unique politi-
cal status quo. Anything short of a meaningful change in that status quo will not
lead to a lifting of the sanctions. To be sure, the target may be forced to try to
substitute some of the foreign assistance, political relationships, or trade and
investment being withheld by the sanction-imposing countries. The target, in
other words, may try to make new-or lean on old-allies. To the extent this is
unsuccessful, the sanctions may bring about the desired change in the regime or
its behavior.
In sum, the criticism that sanctions are ineffectual might be somewhat less biting
with respect to regime-aimed sanctions than with respect to commodity-aimed
sanctions. The rationale is that, absent monopoly, it may be easier for consumers
of an illicit product to find alternative suppliers when one source is sanctioned
than for a target of a regime-based sanction to substitute willing and able friends.
Whether this rationale bears out in practice depends on the relative elasticities
of substitution-for commodity-aimed sanctions, the elasticity of substitution of
one source of the illicit product for another in response to a sanction, and for
regime-aimed sanctions, the elasticity of substitution of one friend for another
53. Bhala, supra note 6, at 37-53.
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in response to a sanction. Undoubtedly, there will be plenty of controversy about
these elasticities before and after sanctions are imposed.
It ought to be noted that a third direction at which sanctions are aimed appears
to be emerging, at least in view of recent international environmental law adjudica-
tions. As of this writing, the United States has controversial bans on imports
of tuna caught using the so-called encirclement method (which involves use of
purse-seine nets) because of the incidental killing of dolphins.m It also has an
import ban on shrimp caught by trawlers from countries not requiring the use
of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) because of the incidental killing of turtles.55
Panels established under the pre-Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) dispute resolution system considered the tuna-dolphin case,
and a panel established under the Uruguay Round's new dispute resolution mecha-
nism considered the shrimp-turtle case.56
In both cases, the panels ruled against the use of GATT Article XX, which
contains general exceptions to GATT obligations, to justify an import ban that
aims not at products but at a production process. The panels found the American
bans were not directed at tuna or shrimp, but at the encirclement method and
the lack ofTEDs, respectively. This distinction is minute and anathema to environ-
mentalists. But, it is welcomed by developing countries, which see the bans as
disguised protectionism and fear the United States will drive up their production
costs by imposing its environmental regulations extraterritorially. The United
States has taken steps to remove the tuna ban by negotiating a multilateral
agreement on dolphin protection-the 1995 Declaration of Panama-and signaling
its willingness to allow importation of tuna from signatory countries."7 But it
intends to appeal the shrimp ruling to the WTO's Appellate Body. Thus, the
future of any process-based sanctions remains to be seen.
F. STEP Six: T-TERMINATION OF THE SANCTION
What criteria, if any, exist in sanctions legislation for terminating the sanctions?
Careful legislators ought to specify conditions, and/or provide discretionary au-
thority to the president, for ending the punishment. But legislators are not always
careful. As sponsored by Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) and enacted by Congress,
the Nuclear Proliferation Act, for example, had no such criteria or authority,
and still has none as of this writing.
There is no formula for termination criteria; sanctions legislation can differ
widely in this regard. At one extreme, they can be as simple as a built-in sunset
54. See Bhala & Kennedy, supra note 22, 1190-1210.
55. See Gregory Shaffer, Trade and the Environment: Options for Resolving the WTO Shrimp-
Turtle Case, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 294 (1998).
56. The panel reports may be obtained through the WTO's website at <http://www.wto.org >.
57. See Rossella Brevetti, Accord Brings Tuna/Dolphin Dispute Closer to Final Resolution,
Official Says, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 284 (1998).
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provision stating that sanctions have a life-span of a specified number of years.
The ILSA sanctions, for example, have a five-year time limit.5" At the other
extreme, the criteria can be a lengthy, inscrutable list of conditions, many of
which are either chimerical or ambiguous and foolishly harsh. As such, the list
might conjure up memories of John Maynard Keynes' 1920 work, The Economic
Consequences of the Peace, a brief tour de force against what Keynes astutely
dubbed the Carthaginian peace imposed by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. In
between these extremes lie innumerable possibilities.
There may be, for example, a prescribed minimum period during which sanc-
tions must remain in effect, followed by the possibility of lifting sanctions under
certain conditions. Here again the ILSA is instructive. After the minimum one-
year period, sanctions against a person may be lifted if the president certifies
that this person no longer is engaged in a prohibited transaction and has provided
reliable assurances that he will not knowingly commit a violation in the future.
Thus, sanctions on Iran might be lifted if the president certifies that Iran no longer
supports international terrorism and has abandoned efforts to obtain weapons of
mass destruction, and sanctions on Libya may be lifted if it complies with certain
United Nations Security Council resolutions. 59
The ILSA termination provisions raise the problem of presidential discretion.
There is, again, no invariable formulaic phrase by which Congress simultaneously
delegates and constrains the president's discretion. At one extreme, the statute
might contain reasonably detailed criteria, as does the ILSA. At the other extreme,
the president's discretion may be constrained by what is in the national interest.
Often, this term is modified with adjectives like important, essential, or vital-
words that muddy the waters-and by a requirement of reporting to Congress.
Assuming there are termination criteria, understanding exactly what they are
is important for at least two reasons. First, the criteria themselves are statements
of expectation. They bespeak to the world what the United States wants the target
to do, or not do, in order to resume normal relations. The Helms-Burton Act is
quite explicit about expecting the overthrow of Fidel Castro before foreign assis-
tance sanctions can be lifted. 6° Second, the criteria help guide businesses on
possible future relations with the target. Consider the ILSA's sunset rule. Does it
not encourage American petroleum companies to continue to foster their informal
contacts-which by no means are barred by the ILSA-with Iran and Libya in
anticipation of the day the sanctions are lifted? In contrast, if the message from
termination criteria (or their absence) is "no way, no how," then American
business has two choices-forget about doing deals with the target, or lobby
58. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 13, effective date; sunset);
see also Bhala, supra note 6, at 113.
59. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9., Duration of sanctions;
Presidential waiver; Sec. 8, Termination of sanctions); see also Bhala, supra note 6, at 112-13.
60. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6033(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1996); see also Bhala, supra note 6, at 57.
VOL. 33, NO. 1
MRS. WATU AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE SANCTIONS 23
Congress and the White House to change the law. Third, termination criteria
may say something about the political maneuvering necessary to pass the sanctions
legislation. A sunset provision may have been required to secure votes, and broad
presidential discretion may have been essential for White House support.
It is difficult to formulate hard a priori generalizations about the controversies
termination provisions might cause, as the degree of controversy will depend in
part on how they are drafted. It would seem that the absence of termination
criteria from sanctions legislation is likely to be controversial, but the controversy
may not occur when the legislation is passed. Indeed, the absence may be deliber-
ate to facilitate passage of the bill. The controversy may come later, after the
sanctions have been in place and have proved ineffectual and hurt innocent people
in the target country. American sanctions against Pakistan pursuant to the Nuclear
Proliferation Act are a case in point. Only days after they were imposed, Pakistan
announced its steadfast determination to maintain a fully operational arsenal of
nuclear missiles.6' A month later, it revealed that its foreign exchange reserves
had been ravaged to the level of $600 million, barely enough to finance three
weeks of imports, 62 and that it had to obtain $250 million in balance of payments
support from Kuwait to stave off its impending debt crisis.63 Could it have been
any surprise that President Clinton then signed legislation to exempt export credits
for farm sales from the American sanctions on both Pakistan and India? 6 Certainly
not, especially in view of the additional fact that this move helped American
farmers ailing from a dramatic fall in wheat prices.65
Still, termination criteria as simple as a sunset provision can be controversial.
Suppose the sanctions induced a bit of change in the target's behavior. The debate
on removal of the sanctions begins. Why punish the target further when it is
trying to change? But why throw away the very stick that seems to have brought
about the improvement? The ILSA is a case in point. Possibly, it has hampered
Iran's ability to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Possibly, it
has impressed on some Iranian leaders-the moderates-the economic benefits
of better ties with the United States. The question thus remains as to whether
the sanctions should be terminated in advance of the five-year sunset date.
G. STEP SEVEN: U-WHETHER THE SANCTION IS UNILATERAL
Is the sanction regime imposed unilaterally by the United States? Or is the
United States acting in cooperation with a large number of countries, possibly
61. See Christopher Thomas, Pakistan Starts Big Build-up of Nuclear Arsenal, THE TIMES (Lon-
don), June 1, 1998, at 11.
62. See Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan Tries to Plug Holes as Foreign Exchange Reserves Drain
Away, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 1998, at 2.
63. See Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan Set to Receive Kuwaiti Aid, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 1998, at 6.
64. See Stephen Fidler, U.S. Clears Way for Wheat Sales, FIN. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at 6.
65. See id.
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under United Nations auspices? It is obviously not difficult to discern whether
sanctions are unilateral or multilateral in nature-simply find out how many
countries in addition to the United States have agreed to punish the target. There is
no shortage of contemporary examples of America acting alone: the Helms-Burton
Act, ILSA, Nuclear Proliferation Act, and Narcotics Trade Act. Recent instances
of unified action are relatively fewer in number. For example, the Gulf War
UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq and the UN-imposed air travel ban to Libya. More
historical illustrations of multilateral action include the apartheid-era sanctions
imposed on South Africa and the former Rhodesia.
A less obvious, but important related inquiry is to discern whether a sanctions
regime is as unilateral, or as multilateral, as it appears. It may be that only the
United States has a de jure measure against a target, but other countries may
shun the target as a de facto matter. These third countries may fear that formal
legal action by them would cause internal political problems, or trigger retaliation
by foreign powers who support the target. The low profile support received by
the United States after the Gulf War from a number of Arab countries is an
example. Who can doubt these countries would like to be rid of Saddam Hussein,
or at least of the threat posed by Iraq acquiring weapons of mass destruction?
But who can doubt that these countries cannot possibly align themselves too
publicly with American-inspired sanctions against Iraq?
Conversely, it may be that many countries have de jure sanctions against a
target, but in fact the measures are observed more in the breach. Third countries
may want to show public support for a sanctions scheme by outlawing certain
transactions and contacts with the target. Perhaps they are rewarded for their
ostensible outrage by receiving American aid, or at least not losing it. But these
countries may be unwilling to enforce the bans because of domestic political,
economic, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or religious considerations. The target may
enjoy support among the local populace. There may be lucrative or even essential
business relations with the target. Sizeable local communities may share an ethnic,
linguistic, or cultural heritage, or a religion with the people of the target country.
Even if a third country intends to live up to its commitment to join a multilateral
sanctions scheme, it may be unable to do so due to a lack of law enforcement
resources or expertise. Or there may be nightmarish geographical problems that
work to the advantage of smugglers and others seeking to defy the ban-for
example, a thick jungle that becomes nearly impassible for large groups of person-
nel and vehicles during the monsoon (not uncommon in Southeast Asia), or
hundreds of miles of cold, mountainous terrain with only treacherous footpaths
(not uncommon in Asia Minor). The broad point is to be chary of appearances.
A de jure unilateral sanctions regime may be de facto multilateral. A de jure
multilateral sanctions regime may be de facto unilateral.
This point sheds some light on the customary a priori expectation that a unilater-
ally imposed sanction will be more controversial than a multilaterally imposed
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one. This is true if reality and appearances coincide. When America behaves
like a cowboy, and no other country follows, America is surely in for at least
a verbal gun battle with her trade partners. After all, a de jure and de facto
unilateral sanctions scheme necessarily means that there is no political or moral
consensus in favor of penalizing the target, while a dejure and defacto multilateral
regime obviously is a manifestation of the opposite circumstances. In the former,
but not the latter instance, criticisms about extraterritoriality, infringement on
sovereignty, and bully-like behavior will be heard coming from capital cities
around the world. But, there are at least two important circumstances when the
expectation of greater controversy with a unilateral regime can break down.
First, it may be that governments fall enthusiastically into line to enact and
enforce a multilateral sanctions scheme. But over time, the cruel and inhuman
effects of the scheme become known. CNN periodically broadcasts stories of
middle-class Iraqis who cannot get medicines to treat simple ailments like fevers
that strike their children. Aid workers call attention to famine conditions in North
Korea. Economists publish studies indicating that constructive engagement with
South Africa would create job opportunities for, and thus empower, blacks. At
this point, the target has become the victim, and the world the torturer, and thus
begins a global public debate about multilateral sanctions schemes. In this regard,
the excellent analyses in the recent British book, Political Gain and Civilian
Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions,66 must be mentioned. Only
the most intransigent reader can emerge from this collection unscathed and in
support of multilateral sanctions.
Second, where reality and appearances do not coincide, controversy may take
a different turn from what was initially expected. Consider an instance where
the United States is the only country to impose sanctions as a matter of law, but
there is considerable support for the sanctions. In this case, the United States
may cajole her trading partners to be more visible in expressing their displeasure
with the target, or the United States may decide that the low-profile approach
of her partners is as much as can be expected, and perhaps rather effective to
boot. But where there is a de jure multilateral scheme, and in practice some of
America's trading partners are sieves through which goods and services pass to
the target, Washington undoubtedly will decry the hypocrisy-loudly or behind
the scenes, but in either event directly to the sieves. Thus, to say that unilateral
sanctions are likely to evoke more controversy than multilateral sanctions is at
best a very gross generalization that breaks down when diverse interest groups
highlight the inhumane effects of multilateral sanctions, and when widely-enacted
sanctions legislation is not enforced.
66. See THOMAS G. WEISS ET AL., POLITICAL GAIN AND CIVILIAN PAIN: HUMANITARIAN IMPACTS
OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1997).
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IV. The Virtues of MRS. WATU
MRS. WATU is a simple yet potent model, summarized in the table at the
outset, for unlocking the complexities of any piece of sanctions legislation. While
it may not encompass all of the important issues raised by such legislation, 67 it
certainly covers the key doctrinal points: (1) the Method(s) of sanction(s) threat-
ened; (2) the possible establishment of a private Right of action; (3) the call for
a Secondary boycott; (4) the existence and nature of Waiver authority; (5) the
Aim of the sanction; (6) the criteria for Terminating the sanction; and (7)whether
the sanction is Unilateral in nature. In brief, MRS. WATU is a friendly analytical
tool for sanctions legislation.
Equally, if not more importantly, MRS. WATU may have some insights into
the future that cut through the loud and often emotional debates over proposed
sanctions legislation. It is a model for any practicing or academic lawyer, regard-
less of political or economic persuasion. Reading a proposal with MRS. WATU
can provide a priori hints about controversies the legislation, if enacted, might
cause. Simultaneous use of multiple methods of sanctions, private rights of action,
secondary boycotts, broad presidential waiver authority, commodity-aimed sanc-
tions, sanctions with no criteria for termination, and unilaterally imposed sanc-
tions may well prove to be particularly disputatious. In this regard, MRS. WATU
is an independent, non-normative, non-empirical model for critically analyzing
sanctions. As America's use of sanctions continues, and perhaps accelerates, any
device that brings even a modicum of order and dispassion to the debate ought
to be welcomed.
67. For instance, another issue that might be pursued is the level of governmental authority that
imposes the sanction. This issue is raised by the array of states and municipalities that have enacted
measures restricting business dealings with Burma. See David R. Schmahmann et al., Offthe Preci-
pice: Massachusetts Expands its Foreign Policy Expedition from Burma to Indonesia, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1021 (1997); David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State
and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997). In April 1998, a coalition of American businesses and the National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc. (NFTC), working with USAEngage, filed suit in the United States District
Court for Massachusetts against Massachusetts' limits on entering into procurement transactions with
firms that do business with Burma. The NFTC argues the scheme violates the Commerce and Foreign
Relations Clauses of the Constitution, which vest the federal government with the power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce and forbid states from burdening such commerce. See Trade Associa-
tion Lawsuit Challenges Massachusetts Burma Sanctions Law, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 797 (1998);
State Sanctions Law to be Subject of Constitutional Challenge, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 343 (1998).
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